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Abstract: Past experimental research has shown that when rating systems are available, buyers 
are more generous in accepting unfair offers in ultimatum bargaining. But it at the same time 
suggests that sellers behave more fairly to avoid receiving negative feedbacks. This paper 
experimentally studies which effect is stronger with a rating system: buyers’ inflated inequity 
acceptance or sellers’ disapproval aversion. We explore this question by varying the information 
condition on buyers’ side. Our experiment shows that in the setup where the size of pie is 
common knowledge to both buyers and sellers, when a rating system is present, the sellers 
exhibit disapproval aversion but the buyers do not raise inequity acceptance. But on the other 
hand, when only sellers are aware of the size of the pie, sellers behave aggressively to exploit 
buyers and their behaviors do not change by the presence of a rating system, but instead, buyers 
raise inequity acceptance significantly with the rating system present. We discuss that these 
results can be explained by a theoretical model with sellers’ social disapproval aversion and 
buyers’ disappointment aversion, along with the players’ inequality aversion. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 In recent decades, economists have devoted considerable efforts to studying the impact of 
expressing emotions on people’s behavior with complete information and have found that 
emotional expression may affect both the senders and recipients of the expression. On the one 
hand, it has been documented that people have preferences against receiving disapproval from 
others. Consequently they behave pro-socially so that they do not receive negative feedback.
1
 On 
the other hand, expressing emotions has also been known to affect the behavior of the senders of 
those emotions. For example, in a one-shot ultimatum game, buyers (responders) are more likely 
to accept unfair offers when given opportunities to express emotions (e.g., Xiao and Houser 2005, 
Güth and Levati 2007). This finding suggests that expressing negative emotions is a substitute 
for punishing matched sellers (proposers) and thus increases buyers’ inequity acceptance. But 
which effect is more dominant with a rating system present in ultimatum bargaining: buyers’ 
inflated inequity acceptance or sellers’ disapproval aversion? Does the relative strength of these 
two effects differ by information condition? This paper is the first to study how the impact of 
expressing emotions differs by whether the size of pie is common knowledge to all players 
(complete information) or is only known to sellers (incomplete information).  
 Although past studies used complete information setups to study the effects of expressing 
emotions, understanding such effects under the incomplete information setting is equally 
important for two particular reasons. First, the incomplete information setup is more realistic for 
some circumstances in which sellers are better informed than buyers about products they sell. On 
the one hand, for example, price settings of foods in grocery stores, or standard items, such as 
pens, university textbooks and music CDs, in physical stores or on the online marketplace (e.g., 
Amazon.com) can be described with complete information. On the other hand, some transactions 
                                                          
1
 For example, see Masclet et al. (2003) and Dugar (2013) in public goods games, Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) 
and Xiao and Houser (2009) in a dictator game, and López-Pérez and Vorsatz (2010) in a prisoner’s dilemma game. 
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can be best described by incomplete information on buyers’ side. Examples include used 
products, medical services, and education service, such as higher education. Users usually 
become aware of the quality of goods and services only after they purchase or consume them. A 
rating system is available for some cases (e.g., standard items or used products on the online 
marketplace, lectures at universities), but not for other cases (e.g., goods in grocery stores, used 
items in classified ads, such as Craigslist). 
Second, the asymmetry of information between sellers and buyers is known to change the 
picture of the bargaining between them. Many experiments with complete information have 
demonstrated that people prefer fair outcomes in ultimatum games (see Roth (1995) for a survey). 
At the same time, however, past studies have shown that in incomplete information setups, (a) 
sellers can become greedier and their offering prices can be close to what standard theory predicts 
and, (b) buyers are more likely to accept unfair offers.
2
 These results may extend to an 
environment with a rating system. Moreover, the presence of the rating system may make buyers 
open to even more unfair offers with incomplete information. Buyers behave conservatively to 
avoid disappointment that they may experience when the realized size of pies are lower than their 
expectation. However, with a rating system present, buyers can release such negative emotions 
using ratings; as such, buyers do not need to lower inequity acceptance because of disappointment.  
 Our experiment is built on a finitely-repeated ultimatum game. We design four treatments 
by varying two dimensions. The first dimension is constituted by whether buyers are given the 
opportunity to rate sellers or not. Sellers are informed of their own ratings after the transactions 
are completed. The ratings are not disclosed to other group members and are not carried over 
                                                          
2
 See, for example, Straub and Murnighan (1995), Rapoport et al. (1996), Croson (1996), Güth et al. (1996), and 
Mitzkewitz and Nagel (1993). 
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from period to period.
3
 The second dimension is constituted by whether buyers are informed of 
the size of the pies or not (i.e., complete versus incomplete information). In each treatment, 
subjects are randomly assigned either a role of seller or of buyer. Seller j has one commodity, the 
value of which is randomly drawn from integers between 0 and 40, and is then randomly 
matched with a buyer i. Seller j submits an offering price (psj) and buyer i submits a purchase 
threshold (pbi). If psj ≤ pbi, then the transaction between i and j is closed.  
 We first theoretically describe that bargaining between seller j and buyer i could result in 
more unequal divisions with incomplete information than with complete information conditions. 
We then describe how a fairer or a less fair situation could hold as an equilibrium outcome with a 
rating system if players are inequality averse and sellers exhibit disapproval aversion. We then 
show that buyers’ inflated inequity acceptance could dominate sellers’ disapproval aversion 
when the buyers are not aware of the size of the pies (incomplete information), because buyers 
dislike disappointment from possibly lower size of the pies than expected. 
Our experiment results largely confirm the theoretical analyses with social disapproval 
aversion and disappointment aversion. First, the divisions of the pies were much more unequal 
with incomplete than with complete information. Second, sellers exhibited disapproval aversion 
with complete information, as is consistent with past research. Specifically, the sellers attempted 
to keep smaller shares of the pies when the rating system was available, compared with when it 
was not available. Third, by sharp contrast, with incomplete information, sellers’ disapproval 
aversion did not affect their bargaining behavior. Whether the rating system was present, sellers 
aggressively attempted to take more from their buyers. The presence of rating opportunities 
instead raised buyers’ inequity acceptance. The enhanced buyers’ acceptance to unfair offers 
                                                          
3
 This design is employed because our aim is to measure the effects of a rating system itself without reputation 
effects. 
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increased the inequality in the divisions of the pies. In short, our paper suggests that the rating 
system may have opposite effects depending on the information conditions. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design. 
Section 3 provides theoretical considerations. Section 4 reports results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2.  EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 Our experiment is based on a finitely-repeated ultimatum game. At the onset of the 
experiment, subjects are randomly assigned to an interaction unit (group) with other nine 
subjects. A group of ten subjects is then randomly divided into two subgroups of five subjects. 
Five subjects in one subgroup are assigned roles of seller (proposer) and the five in the other 
subgroup are assigned roles of buyer (responder).
4
 The initially assigned roles do not change 
throughout the entire experiment. Subjects do not interact with subjects in other groups. The 
number of periods is 50 and there is no break between periods.  
The structure of each period is identical. At the onset of a period t, each seller is 
randomly matched with a buyer in his group. Since there are five buyers and five sellers in a 
group, the probability that a seller is matched with the same buyer both in period t and period t − 
1 is 20%. In each period, every seller has one commodity whose quality is the same across all 
five sellers in the group. The quality (true value) of the commodity, qt, is randomly (i.e., with a 
probability of 1/41) drawn from the set of integers ranging between 0 and 40 in every period. 
The random drawing process is independent across periods. The experimental design follows the 
standard ultimatum games with a strategy method. Each seller proposes a price, psj, to sell a 
commodity to his matched buyer. They can sell at most one commodity. psj must be an integer 
ranging from 0 to 40. Each buyer simultaneously submits a purchase threshold, pbi, to her 
                                                          
4
 In the experimental sessions, two subsets of subjects are called “buyers” and “sellers” as written in the paper. The 
framing of buyers and sellers is often used in experiments with ultimatum games (e.g., Roth et al. 1991).  
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matched seller.
5
 If psj ≤ pbi, the deal between buyer i and seller j is closed; seller j obtains a 
payoff of psj − qt/2, and buyer i obtains a payoff of qt – psj. Here, we can interpret qt/2 as the 
production cost of a commodity or the value of it for the seller. If psj > pbi, the deal is not closed; 
the payoffs of both players are zero in that period. Note that when a deal is closed but qt – psj < 0, 
the buyer incurs a loss. Each player is informed of their own interaction outcome at the end of 
each period. Buyer i is then made aware of the seller’s offering price. However, seller j is not 
informed of the matched buyer’s purchase threshold; and the seller is only informed of whether 
the offer was accepted. Subjects are paid based on the sum of their payoffs earned during all 50 
periods.
6
 The number of periods, the assignment procedure of the roles, the distribution of qt, and 
the interaction rules, such as the formula of payoffs, are all common knowledge to subjects. 
 We design four treatments by varying two dimensions in the experiment. The first 
dimension is whether the value of the commodity (qt) is known to both sellers and buyers, or is 
only known to sellers, before transactions in each period. In the incomplete information 
condition, the buyers learn the realized value of qt at the end of each period.
7
  The second 
dimension is whether there is a rating system available to buyers or not. The four treatments are 
named as the “No Rating, Complete Information” (N-C) treatment, the “Rating, Complete 
Information” (R-C) treatment, the “No Rating, Incomplete Information” (N-IC) treatment, and 
the “Rating, Incomplete Information” (R-IC) treatment. 
                                                          
5
 Strategy methods are widely used in experiments with ultimatum games. The benefit of using the strategy methods 
is to elicit the upper bound of the buyer’s purchase decision (acceptance). With the standard, sequential direct-
response method, we only observe a buyer’s acceptance to a specific offer, not the threshold.  Past studies also find 
that there is no difference in mean offer or mean acceptance rate between the two methods with complete 
information. They further indicate little difference in subjects’ behavior between the two methods when used in 
ultimatum games with incomplete information on buyer's side (see Brandts and Charness 2011 for a survey).  
6
 The participation fee is guaranteed even if a subject’s accumulated payoff is negative. In the experiment, 0%, 0%, 
11.25% and 18.75% of the buyers in the N-C, R-C, N-IC and R-IC treatments, respectively received only 
participation fees due to their negative accumulated payoffs. 
7
 The setup of the incomplete information condition is similar to the experimental design such as the one used in 
Rapoport et al. (1996). For example, in Rapoport et al. (1996), the size of the pie in an ultimatum game is randomly 
distributed from a uniform distribution [a, b] and the realized size is private information of the sellers. 
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In the R-C and R-IC treatments, each buyer is given an opportunity to rate their matched 
seller on a 10-point scale in every period after learning their transaction outcome (including their 
own and their matched seller’s payoffs). Buyers are instructed that the lowest number (0) means 
“very unfair;” 3 means “unfair;” 7 means “fair;” and the highest number (10) means “very fair.”  
 At the end of each treatment, demographic information, such as gender, is collected. 
These responses are used as control variables in data analysis. 
3.  THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION AND HYPOTHESES 
Each seller is randomly assigned an identification number, is then randomly paired with a 
buyer and interacts with each other in every period. As discussed in Section 2, the number of 
interactions is finite and is common knowledge to both the buyers and the sellers.  The standard 
theory therefore predicts the same behavior of the subjects in each stage game. The standard 
theory predictions are the same between the N-C and R-C treatments, and also between the N-IC 
and R-IC treatments, because the rating opportunities held by buyers do not affect the (material) 
payoffs of the buyers and sellers. 
Our experiment uses the standard ultimatum games with a strategy method. Thus, there 
are multiple equilibrium outcomes in each treatment. First, in the N-C and R-C treatments, for a 
given qt, any division of the pie: (p – qt/2)/(qt/2)100[%] for the seller and (qt – 
p)/(q/2)100[%] for the buyer, where p ∈ [qt/2, qt], can be realized as an equilibrium outcome. 
Note that the size of pie in this experiment is qt/2 (= qt – qt/2). Under a Nash Equilibrium, the 
same p is offered by a seller and is also set as a purchase threshold by the buyer; and their 
transaction is closed. In addition, there are many equilibrium outcomes where deals are not 
closed, and both sellers and buyers receive nothing (see Appendix A.1).  
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Second, in the N-IC and R-IC treatments, while a seller can condition his strategy on qt, 
the matched buyer selects a purchase threshold pb irrespective of qt, as the buyer is not informed 
of the value of qt. We write psj: [0, 40]  [0, 40] as the strategy of seller j, and pbi  [0, 40] as 
the strategy of buyer i.
8
 As shown in Appendix A.3, we find two kinds of Bayesian Nash 
Equilibria (BNE). In the first kind of equilibrium, the seller has a clear advantage: the buyer 
obtains an expected payoff of 0 and only the seller obtains a positive payoff.
9
 In other words, 
only extremely unequal divisions of the pies are realized as equilibrium outcomes. In the second 
class of BNE, the transaction is not executed. The following is an example: the seller always 
posts a price so that ps > 20, and the buyer sets her purchase threshold at 0.  
Summary 1: Equilibrium Analysis Based on the Standard Theory. 
There are multiple equilibria in all of the four treatments. In an equilibrium where a deal is 
closed, both the buyer and seller can obtain positive shares of the pie in the N-C and R-C 
treatments. However, in the N-IC and R-IC treatments, only a very unequal division of the pie is 
observed in a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium where a deal is closed. 
Based on Summary 1, we now have the following testable hypothesis on the impact of 
the information condition on subjects’ divisions of the pies. 
Hypothesis 1: A more unequal division of the pies is realized in the N-IC and R-IC treatments 
than in the N-C and R-C treatments. 
 
Players’ Inequality Aversion and Sellers’ Disapproval Aversion: 
                                                          
8
 Although we use a discrete interval {0, 1, …, 40} for the choice space in the experiment, we use a continuous 
interval [0, 40] for simplicity in our theoretical analysis. 
9
 For instance, the following is an equilibrium: the seller proposes ps = 𝑝𝑠(𝑞𝑡) = 𝑐 for 𝑞𝑡 ≤ 2𝑐; and 𝑝𝑠(𝑞𝑡) = 𝑞𝑡 for 
𝑞𝑡 > 2𝑐, and the buyer submits pb = c as her purchase threshold. Here, c is any constant that is less than or equal to 
20. Although there are multiple BNE of this class, the expected payoff of the seller differs by equilibrium and is 
maximized when the following equilibrium is realized: ps = 𝑝𝑠(𝑞𝑡) = 20 for all qt, and pb = 20. The expected payoff 
of the seller is then 10. This implies that the Pareto dominant BNE is that the seller always proposes to sell the 
commodity at a price of 20, and the buyer sets the purchase threshold at the price of 20. 
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Unlike Summary 1, buyers obtain some positive payoffs and thus the divisions of the pies 
can be less unequal in equilibrium even in the incomplete information treatments, once we 
assume that people have other-regarding preferences. As an illustration, assume that all subjects 
have inequality-averse preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and that it is common 
knowledge. The utility function of the inequality-averse buyer can be expressed as:  
 ubi(𝜋𝑏𝑖, 𝜋𝑠𝑗) = 𝜋𝑏𝑖 − µi ∙ f(𝜋𝑏𝑖 −  𝜋𝑠𝑗), (1) 
where µi indicates the utility weight of inequality of buyer i and it differs by buyer. In our 
theoretical analysis, we use the following quadratic function as f(.):
10
 
  𝑓(𝜋𝑏𝑖 − 𝜋𝑠𝑗) = (𝜋𝑏𝑖 − 𝜋𝑠𝑗)
2
. (2) 
The utility function of inequality-averse seller j can be defined likewise:  
 usj(𝜋𝑠𝑗, 𝜋𝑏𝑖) = 𝜋𝑠𝑗 − µj ∙ f(𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜋𝑏𝑖).  (3) 
As shown in Appendix A.2, regardless of the information condition, the seller’s best response 
strategy (price) would depend on qt and µj, and in equilibrium where a deal is closed, both the 
seller and the buyer always obtain positive (expected) payoffs in all the treatments.
11
 As a result, 
for a given qt, the degree of inequality with the division of the pies is mitigated to some degree.
12
    
    Next, we consider how the presence of the rating system may affect the players’ 
behaviors using the model with inequality aversion (Eqs. (1) to (3)).  As in past research, let us 
assume that a seller incurs a psychological loss when the seller receives a negative rating from 
                                                          
10
 Our choice of a quadratic function is due to its tractability, but would not lose many important implications 
because of this choice. Quadratic functional forms are sometimes used in theoretical analyses of subjects’ behaviors. 
For example, see Cappelen et al. (2013) and Kamei (forthcoming). 
11
 The seller’s best offering price is increasing in qt, but with a slope less than 1, when qt is sufficiently smaller than 
the seller’s belief on the buyer’s purchase threshold, because the seller prefers fairer outcomes. If a realized qt is in 
some range close to a given buyer’s purchase threshold pbi, the seller attempts to submit pbi as her offering price, 
although the seller offers a price strictly greater than pbi when qt is sufficiently large (Appendix Figure A.2). The 
buyer, given psj, attempts to submit psj as his purchase threshold, so long as the buyer’s utility is non-negative. 
12
 Another other-regarding preference model is an intention-based social preference model such as a reciprocity 
model (e.g., Rabin 1993, Charness and Rabin 2002, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and Fischbacher 2006, 
Cox et al. 2007). In a reciprocity model, agents react hostilely to hostile acts taken toward them by their opponents. 
In our experiment, buyers have the opportunity to reject unfair offers proposed by sellers. Thus, such a reciprocity 
model would also predict a fairer division of the potential gain between the two parties. 
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his buyer, but the seller receives a psychological gain when the rating is positive. With this 
assumption, the direction of the effects of the rating system does not differ by the information 
condition. We use the R-C treatment to illustrate possible consequences of expressing emotions, 
incorporating the framework used by Cooper and Lightle (2011, 2012) into our setup. For 
simplicity, also assume that the psychological loss or gain of a seller is proportional to the 
difference from the neutral rating, 5, and is expressed as: c∙(r – 5), where c is a positive constant 
and r is the rating (∈ {0, 1, …, 9 ,10}). With this setup, the seller’s payoff is re-written by 𝜋𝑠𝑗′: 
 𝜋𝑠𝑗
′ = 𝜋𝑠𝑗 + 𝑐 ∙ (𝑟 –  5). (4) 
We also assume that there are no costs on the buyer’s side because giving ratings are 
mandatory.
13
 In this framework, seller j selects psj to maximize his utility usj(𝜋𝑠𝑗′, 𝜋𝑏𝑖). Buyer i 
selects pbi and then r in the later rating stage to maximize her utility ubi(𝜋𝑏𝑖, 𝜋𝑠𝑗′). As detailed in 
Appendix A.5, the buyer would utilize the rating opportunity so as to shrink her disutility from 
inequality (i.e., µi ∙ f(𝜋𝑏𝑖 −  𝜋𝑠𝑗′)). This implies that when their transaction is closed (pbi ≥ psj), 
the buyer’s rating scores are negatively correlated with the seller’s offering prices (equivalently 
the seller’s payoff).14 This analysis is summarized as Hypothesis 2 below: 
Hypothesis 2: Buyers give positive (negative) ratings to sellers who take less (more) from the 
pies when their transactions are closed. 
Because the disutility the buyer incurs from material inequality diminishes by acts of 
expressing emotions, the buyer shows more willingness to accept a higher price (i.e., an unfair 
division of pie), compared with when the rating system is not available. Note that the buyer 
would accept an offer by matching pbi with the seller’s offering price whenever ubi(𝜋𝑏𝑖, 𝜋𝑠𝑗’) ≥ 0 
in equilibrium. However, as explained in Appendix A.5, there is not only a fairer equilibrium but 
                                                          
13
 Adding a show-up fee in the payoff function of a player does not change the calculation. For notational simplicity 
we did not include the show-up fee in the payoff functions. 
14
 When it is not closed, the buyer would give a rating of 5 (the neutral rating) to the seller. 
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also a less fair equilibrium with rating than without rating, due to psychological costs or gains 
associated with receiving negative or positive feedbacks. On the one hand, the disapproval-
averse seller would attempt to keep less by setting a lower price in the R-C (R-IC) than in the N-
C (N-IC) treatment when the seller expects to incur a psychological cost from receiving a 
negative feedback. On the other hand, the seller would oppositely attempt to keep more in the R-
C (R-IC) than in the N-C (N-IC) treatment when he expects to receive a positive feedback. The 
former (latter) situation leads to an equilibrium in which fairer (less fair) divisions of the pies are 
realized, compared with a situation without a rating possibility.  
Summary 2: Equilibrium Analysis based on Inequality Aversion and Disapproval Aversion. 
(a) Given q, buyers exhibit more willingness to accept unfair offers in the R-C (R-IC) than in the 
N-C (N-IC) treatment. However, (b) there exists not only a fairer equilibrium but also a less fair 
equilibrium in the R-C (R-IC) than in the N-C (N-IC) treatment.  
 
Buyers’ Disappointment Aversion: 
Under which information condition could buyers exhibit stronger inequity acceptance: 
complete or incomplete information? We now explain that stronger inequity acceptance may be 
observed in the incomplete information setting because of buyers’ disappointment aversion. A 
large body of literature suggests that a subject could incur a disutility from disappointment if 
realized outcomes are lower than his/her certainty equivalent in risky decisions (see Gul (1991) 
and Routledge and Zin (2010) for theoretical models). If buyers exhibit disappointment aversion 
in our context, their purchase thresholds would differ between the R-IC and N-IC treatments, 
even without disapproval aversion (see Appendix Section A.6 for an illustrative analysis in a 
simple setting). This results from two forces: (a) disappointment-averse buyers in the N-IC 
treatment would submit low purchase thresholds to avoid disappointment from possibly lower q, 
but (b) disappointment aversion would not affect buyers’ behaviors in the R-IC treatment 
12 
 
because of the rating opportunity.
15
 In contrast to the incomplete information setup, buyers 
would not experience such disappointment in the R-C and N-C treatments as they are aware of qt 
when making decisions. The likely impact of buyers’ disappointment aversion with incomplete 
information suggests that the difference in buyers’ inequity acceptance between with and without 
rating could be larger in the incomplete information than the complete information setup. 
Summary 3: Analysis based on Inequality Aversion and Buyers’ Disappointment Aversion. 
 Stronger degree of inflated inequity acceptance is observed in the incomplete information than 
in the complete information setup. 
We explained that the theoretical analyses do not provide a point prediction (Summary 
2(b)). One may wonder to which equilibrium subjects’ interactions could converge through 
adjustments in their strategy over the course of repetition.
16
 We could provide a hypothesis to 
this question using past research findings and Summary 3. On the one hand, as mentioned in 
Section 1, people are known to prefer to avoid receiving disapproval from others and therefore 
behave more fairly when a rating system is available in complete information settings (e.g., 
Masclet et al. 2003, Dugar 2013, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008, López-Pérez and Vorsatz 
2010, Xiao and Houser 2009). This suggests that subjects’ interactions could converge to a fairer 
equilibrium in the R-C treatment. In such equilibrium, sellers’ disapproval aversion can dominate 
buyers’ inflated inequity acceptance. But on the other hand, a less fair equilibrium may be 
instead realized with incomplete information, because of Summary 3. Due to disappointment-
averse motives, buyers could exhibit lower inequity acceptance in the N-IC than in the N-C 
treatment. However, because of the presence of the rating system, buyers in the R-IC treatment 
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 Buyers can cancel out the negative emotions from disappointment, by releasing them through rating acts. 
16
 Both buyers and sellers would change their action choices over time even if they have stable inequality-averse 
preferences because the design of each treatment is based on the ultimatum game with a strategy method and has 
multiple equilibria. As in the discussion in Cooper and Dutcher (2011), the subjects’ learning process is determined 
by the distribution of their beliefs on others’ behaviors if they hold inequality-averse or reciprocal preferences. The 
reinforcement learning theory may also account for learning behaviors of some subjects. 
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do not need to care about disutility from disappointment and might accordingly become more 
vulnerable to their sellers’ exploitable behaviors. Reflecting buyers’ vulnerability, their 
interactions could converge to a less fair equilibrium where sellers no longer exhibit disapproval 
aversion in the R-IC treatment. These considerations provide our third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: (a) Sellers exhibit strong disapproval aversion in the R-C treatment. (b) By 
contrast, in the R-IC treatment, buyers exhibit strong inequity acceptance.  
4. RESULTS 
 Four sessions per treatment – two at Brown University and two at the National Taiwan 
University, were conducted. A total of 320 students participated in the experiment. All 
instructions were neutrally framed (see the Appendix for the instructions).
17
 The experiment was 
programmed and conducted with the software in ztree (Fischbacher 2007). All participants were 
students at Brown University or National Taiwan University.
18
 No subjects participated in more 
than one session. Each session contained two groups, which consisted of ten subjects each. The 
value of the commodity (qt) was randomly selected in every period, and the same value was used 
for qt for both groups.
19
 The sessions on average lasted for one hour. No communication between 
subjects was permitted during sessions. Subjects had to answer several control questions to make 
sure their understanding of the experiment before the sessions began.  
                                                          
17
 We first wrote the instructions in English. Chen and her research assistant (both are native speakers of Mandarin) 
translated them carefully to Mandarin so that there is no wording with positive or negative connotations. 
18
 They were recruited by solicitation emails via the BUSSEL (Brown University Social Science Experimental 
Laboratory) for the USA sessions, and via TASSEL (Taiwan Social Science Experimental Laboratory) for the 
Taiwan sessions. The sessions in the USA were conducted in July to September 2013 and July and August in 2016. 
The sessions in Taiwan were conducted in September and October 2016. The numbers of female subjects were 79 
(49.38% of the subjects) for the USA sessions and 58 (36.25% of the subjects) for the Taiwan sessions. The 
numbers of subjects with economics majors were 28 (17.50% of the subjects) for the USA sessions and 25 (15.63% 
of the subjects) for the Taiwan sessions. Subjects were privately paid immediately at the end of the session. The 
average earnings (including show-up fee) were $17.0 in the USA sessions and 338.3 NT dollars (around $10.6) in 
Taiwan sessions. We note that the minimum hourly wage in Taiwan was 133 NT dollars as of September 2016. 
19
 This feature was employed due to its simplicity. Nevertheless, this feature potentially causes subjects’ behaviors 
within sessions to be correlated with each other (e.g., Fréchette 2012). We include session clustering or use 
bootstrap standard errors when we perform regression analyses in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
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 Section 4 is devoted to an analysis of subjects’ behaviors, linking to the hypotheses 
formulated in Section 3. We will first go over descriptive statistics in Section 4.1. We will next 
report buyers’ rating behaviors in Section 4.2. Lastly, we will study the impact of each treatment 
factor while also considering the panel structure of data in Section 4.3. 
4.1. Bargaining between Sellers and Buyers and their Interaction Outcomes 
Table 1 shows key results by treatment, separately for the USA and Taiwan sessions. In 
this table, so as to study subjects’ bargaining behaviors, we calculated the amounts attempted to 
be kept by a seller, which we call the “keep” of the seller in the paper, and the share of it out of 
the size of pie, which we call the “keep share” of the seller. As the size of pie in this experiment 
is qt/2 (= qt – qt/2), seller j’s keep value and keep share are each calculated as (𝑝𝑠𝑗
𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡/2 ) and 
(𝑝𝑠𝑗
𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡/2 )/(𝑞𝑡/2), respectively. Likewise, we calculated the payoff of a buyer based on the 
lowest acceptable offer specified by the buyer, i.e., (𝑞𝑡 − 𝑝𝑏𝑖
𝑡 ); which we call the “keep” of the 
buyer. We also define buyer i’s “keep share” as (𝑞𝑡 − 𝑝𝑏𝑖
𝑡 )/(𝑞𝑡/2).  
Among others, four clear findings, each of which holds both for the USA and Taiwan 
sessions, were obtained. First, as consistent with Hypothesis 1, the divisions of the pies 
drastically differ by the information condition (see columns (7) and (15)). The average realized 
shares of sellers for closed deals were around 45% to 52% in the N-C and R-C treatments. 
However, sellers become more selfish with incomplete information. Unlike the N-C and R-C 
treatments, the average keep shares of sellers were significantly higher than 1 in the N-IC and R-
IC treatments (columns (4) and (12)).
20,21
 As a result, the average realized shares of sellers were 
                                                          
20
 The null hypothesis that sellers’ average keep shares are equal to 1 is rejected in each of the four comparisons, 
according to one-sided t tests (p < .0001, p < .001, p < .0001, and p < .01 in the Taiwan N-IC, the USA N-IC, the 
Taiwan R-IC, and the USA R-IC sessions, respectively). 
21
 38.0% (32.2%) and 33.3% (42.2%) of the sellers’ offering prices were greater than q in the N-IC and R-IC 
treatments, respectively, for the USA (Taiwan) sessions. These percentages are significantly higher than the same 
percentages seen in the corresponding complete information treatments, which are 4.1% (1.8%) and 4.5% (7.1%), 
for the USA (Taiwan) sessions, according to two-sided chi-squared tests (p-value < .001). We note that the 
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much higher than 100% in the N-IC and R-IC treatments (columns (7) and (15)).
22
 Due to the 
sellers’ aggressive behaviors, buyers’ average acceptance rates were significantly lower with 
incomplete than with complete information, for each comparison (columns (8) and (16)).
23,24
  
RESULT 1: Hypothesis 1 holds. This can be explained by sellers’ attempts to take more from 
buyers with incomplete information. Because of the sellers’ aggressive behaviors, buyers’ 
acceptance rates were lower with incomplete information than with complete information. 
 Second, as consistent with Hypothesis 3(a), the average sellers’ keep and keep share were 
both lower in the R-C than in the N-C treatment (columns (3), (4), (11), and (12)).
25
 This 
suggests that sellers exhibited disapproval aversion in the R-C treatment. However, the buyers’ 
bargaining behaviors are almost at the same levels between the R-C and N-C treatments 
(columns (5), (6), (13), and (14)). Third, by clear contrast, the average sellers’ keep and keep 
share were both larger with rating than without rating in the incomplete information setting. This 
suggests that sellers did not exhibit disapproval aversion in the R-IC treatment. However, as 
consistent with Hypothesis 3(b), buyers’ behaviors were significantly affected by the presence of 
the rating system. Both buyers’ keep and keep shares were by far lower in the R-IC than in the 
N-IC treatment (see again columns (5), (6), (13), and (14)).
26
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
percentage of events in which buyers received negative payoffs is significantly larger in the N-IC (R-IC) than in the 
N-C (R-C) treatment, regardless of the subject pool (p-value < .001, two-sided chi-squared test). 
22
 The sellers’ average realized shares are significantly different between the N-C and N-IC treatments in the USA (p 
< .0001) and Taiwan (p < .0001), according to two-sided Mann-Whitney tests. Likewise, these are significantly 
different between the R-C and R-IC treatments in the USA (p < .0001) and Taiwan (p < .0001). 
23
 The difference in the average acceptance rate between the N-C and N-IC treatments is significant for each of the 
USA and Taiwan sessions, according to a Mann-Whitney test based on the average rates where sellers’ offers were 
accepted over 50 periods (p-value < .001, two-sided). The same holds for a comparison between the R-C and R-IC 
treatments, whether the USA subjects or Taiwan subjects are used. See also Appendix Table B.1.  
24 The levels of acceptance rates were high from the onset, and they then rose from period to period at small rates in 
all treatments (Appendix Table B.1). This suggests that the acceptable range of buyers largely coincided with that of 
sellers from earlier periods and they just gradually needed to adjust action choices over time. 
25
 Two sided Mann-Whitney tests, based on pooled data of sellers’ average decisions, find that the difference in 
sellers’ keep share is significant between the N-C and R-C treatments with p = .0220. 
26
 Two sided Mann-Whitney tests, based on pooled data of buyers’ average decisions, find that the difference in 
buyers’ keep (keep share) is significant between the N-IC and R-IC treatments with p = .0138 (p = .0262). 
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RESULT 2: (i) With complete information, as consistent with Hypothesis 3(a), sellers’ keep 
values and keep shares were both lower in the R-C than in the N-C treatment. (ii) With 
incomplete information, as consistent with Hypothesis 3(b), buyers’ keep values and keep shares 
were both lower in the R-IC than in the N-IC treatment. 
 Fourth, the impact of the rating system on subjects’ bargaining outcomes differs by the 
information condition (columns (7) and (15)), because of Result 2. With complete information, 
the presence of the rating system reduced realized shares of sellers from closed trades. With 
incomplete information, by contrast, it instead increased realized shares of sellers and 
accordingly the division of the pies became more unequal between sellers and buyers.  
4.2. Buyers’ Rating Behaviors 
 As explained in Section 4.1, subjects’ behaviors were consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
However, whether sellers are disapproval averse or not, buyers became more tolerant to unfair 
offers with than without a rating system if buyers dislike disappointment from possibly lower q 
(see Section 3). To what extent does our data fit the theoretical implications obtained based on 
disapproval aversion? In order to address this question, we will test Hypothesis 2.  
We take a regression approach in which the dependent variable is a rating score given 
from buyer i to seller j (Table 2). In this regression, either the matched seller j’s keep (columns 
(1) and (2)) or keep share (columns (3) and (4)) is included as an independent variable.
27
 First, 
the estimation shows that when their transactions are closed, these two independent variables are 
both negative predictors for the rating scores sellers receive from buyers, both in the R-C and R-
IC treatments. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2, and in line with findings from past research 
(e.g., Xiao and Houser 2005, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008, Lumeau et al. 2015). This 
                                                          
27
 The buyer’s payoff or share based on the seller’s keep was not included as an independent variable because it is a 
linear transformation of the seller’s keep or keep share. 
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suggests that at least buyers believe that sellers would dislike receiving disapproval also with 
incomplete information, and Result 2(ii) may mean the impact of buyers’ disappointment 
aversion exceeds that of sellers’ disapproval aversion. 
Second, Table 2 also showed that even when their transactions were not closed, sellers’ 
keep shares (sellers’ keep values) were significantly negatively correlated with the matched 
buyers’ ratings in the R-C (R-IC) treatment. This is not consistent with the theoretical analysis 
we discussed based on sellers’ social disapproval aversion in Section 3. This may mean that 
sellers’ intentions to take more alone, even if it did not succeed, may affect the matched buyers’ 
welfare and as such, buyers use the rating opportunities to deal with such psychological disutility. 
RESULT 3: Whether transactions were closed or not, buyers were more likely to give negative 
ratings to sellers who attempted to take more from the pies.
28
  
4.3. Treatment Effects of the Information Condition and the Rating System 
 We saw that the information condition have clear impact on sellers’ bargaining behaviors 
in Section 4.1. We also found that the impact of the rating opportunity differs by the information 
condition, as consistent with Hypothesis 3. This section is devoted to an analysis of the treatment 
effects of the information condition and the rating system while controlling for the structure of 
panel data. We combined data of the USA and Taiwan subjects in the analysis, as the general 
patterns of their behaviors were similar between the two subject groups (Section 4.1, Table 1).  
We first give an overview to the trends of subjects’ bargaining behaviors. Figure 1 
reports the trends of buyers’ and sellers’ keep shares in the two complete information treatments. 
It shows that sellers’ keep shares were lower in the R-C than in the N-C treatment in most 
                                                          
28
 To supplement Table 2, we also estimated the Heckman two-stage selection model, with the dependent variable in 
the first stage being whether transactions were closed or not. This model has an advantage in that we can allow 
coefficients of all the independent variables in the second stage to be different by whether deals were closed or not. 
We used buyers’ last period purchase thresholds as an instrument. Results we obtained in this additional analysis 
were qualitatively similar to that of Table 2. See Appendix Table B.2. 
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periods. By contrast, there were no specific patterns for the trends of buyers’ keep shares. These 
results resonate with the idea that sellers are disapproval-averse agents and thus consistently 
attempt to keep smaller shares in the R-C treatment to avoid receiving negative feedbacks, 
compared with the N-C treatment. This picture dramatically changed with the incomplete 
information setups (Figure 2). In Figure 2, we drew the trend of pbi, but not buyers’ keep shares, 
as buyers were not aware of q in submitting pbi. First, buyers’ purchase thresholds were 
consistently higher with rating (the R-IC treatment) than without rating (the N-IC treatment). By 
contrast, the trends of sellers’ keep shares were on average at very high levels and were similar 
between the N-IC and R-IC treatments. This resonates with the idea that buyers become more 
inequity-acceptable when they have an ex-post opportunity to rate, because the buyers do not 
need to care about disappointment due to possibly lower q in the incomplete information setting.  
The results we obtained in Section 4.1 and the patterns seen at Figures 1 and 2 are largely 
confirmed by a formal analysis, where individual random-effects linear regression are used 
(Table 3).
29
 First, as consistent with Result 1, whether the rating system is available or not, 
sellers attempt to take significantly more from the pies with incomplete than with complete 
information (variables (b) and (c), Wald test 1 in columns (1) and (2)). Second, the impact of the 
rating system differs clearly by the information condition. On the one hand, as consistent with 
Result 2(i), sellers keep less in the complete information setup when the rating system is present 
than otherwise. This effect is significant at the 10% level (variable (a) in columns (1) and (2)). 
Parallel to this result, buyers decreased inequity acceptance in the R-C treatment (variable (a) in 
columns (3) and (4)). On the other hand, with incomplete information, buyers attempt to keep 
less with rating than without rating, as consistent with Result 2(ii). This effect is significant at the 
                                                          
29
 We did not include the interaction terms between the period number variable and treatment dummies as 
independent variables because of two reasons. First, any of the interaction terms does not obtain significant 
coefficients even if we include them. Second, we suffer from serious colinearity problems if we add these terms. The 
variance inflation factors for variables (a), (b) and (c) are much larger than 5 if these interaction terms are included. 
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1% level (Wald test 2 in columns (3) and (4)). We thus conclude that what equilibrium outcome 
is realized with rating may largely depend on the information conditions.  
RESULT 4: Results 1 and 2 hold also when we test the impact of each treatment factor while 
controlling for the panel data structure. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper investigated the effects of expressing emotions in a finitely-repeated 
ultimatum game. In the treatments where both sellers and buyers were aware of the value of 
commodity, sellers exhibited disapproval aversion with a rating system present. By contrast, 
buyers did not raise inequity acceptance in that condition. The picture changed drastically once 
buyers were uninformed of the value of commodity. With the incomplete information setup, 
sellers no longer exhibited disapproval aversion; and they attempted to take much larger shares 
from buyers regardless of the presence of the rating system. Buyers, who were put in weaker 
positions, became more open to accept unfair offers if the rating system is available.  
 As a last remark, we note that although our results are clear, there are many areas for 
future research. For example, details of the experimental setups might affect the direction or 
degree of the effects of expressing emotions. For instance, the payoffs of buyers were negative if 
ps > q in our design. Our setup is reasonable for a wider variety of circumstances, but it would 
also be a useful follow-up study to examine the same question in a setup where sellers are 
required to split the pie so that both sellers and buyers obtain non-negative payoffs. Second, it 
would also be useful to perform a robustness check using different games, such as prisoner’s 
dilemma games, to establish the behavioral regularity of our findings. It is possible that the 
relative strength of disapproval aversion may differ in other games. Finally, needless to say, 
more replication studies would be essential as results may depend on various factors such as 
culture and populations, although we found similar patterns between the USA and Taiwan.   
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TABLE 1: Summary of Results 
(I) USA Sessions 
 
           
Treatment 
name 
Rating Information 
condition 
Number of 
subjects  
(Number 
of groups) 
Avg.  
value of 
commodity: 
?̅?#2  
Average keep and average keep share Bargaining outcomes 
Sellers’  
keep:  
𝑝𝑠 −
𝑞
2
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
Sellers’  
keep share:  
(𝑝𝑠 −
𝑞
2
) / (
𝑞
2
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
Buyers’  
keep:  
𝑞 − 𝑝𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
Buyers’  
keep share:  
(𝑞 − 𝑝𝑏)/ (
𝑞
2
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
Avg. shares of 
sellers in 
closed deals
#1
   
Average 
acceptance 
rate 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
           
           
N-C (No 
Rating, 
Complete 
Information) 
No qt is known 
to both 
sellers and 
buyers 
40 (4) 18.57 
[12.80] 
5.30 
[4.22] 
0.56 
[0.25] 
2.56 
[3.54] 
0.23 
[2.05] 
51.61% 81.60% 
R-C (Rating, 
Complete 
Information) 
Yes qt is known 
to both 
sellers and 
buyers 
40 (4) 18.54 
[12.23] 
4.85 
[4.31] 
0.49 
[0.23] 
2.56 
[4.85] 
0.25 
[1.12] 
45.52% 81.70% 
N-IC (No 
Rating, 
Incomplete 
Information) 
No qt is known 
only to 
sellers  
40 (4) 20.94 
[11.64] 
8.03 
[5.15] 
1.53 
[2.26] 
2.18 
[13.45] 
-1.03 
[3.72] 
176.68% 60.60% 
R-IC (Rating, 
Incomplete 
Information) 
Yes qt is known 
only to 
sellers  
40 (4) 22.78 
[11.86] 
9.04 
[5.19] 
2.04 
[5.40] 
0.23 
[14.60] 
-1.88 
[7.55] 
243.88% 
 
64.00% 
All data --- --- 160 (16) 
20.21 
[12.27] 
6.80 
[5.06] 
1.16 
[3.00] 
1.88 
[10.41] 
-0.61 
[4.45] 
118.35% 71.98% 
           
Notes: The numbers in squared bracket are standard errors. 
#1
 The average share of buyers in a given treatment is 100% minus the value in this 
column. 
#2
 The average size of the pie is ?̅?/2. 
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(II) Taiwan Sessions 
 
           
Treatment 
name 
Rating Information 
condition 
Number of 
subjects 
(Numbers 
of groups) 
Avg.  
value of 
commodity: 
?̅?  
Average keep and average keep share Bargaining outcomes 
Sellers’  
keep:  
𝑝𝑠 −
𝑞
2
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
Sellers’  
keep share:  
(𝑝𝑠 −
𝑞
2
) / (
𝑞
2
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
Buyers’  
keep:  
𝑞 − 𝑝𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
Buyers’  
keep share:  
(𝑞 − 𝑝𝑏)/ (
𝑞
2
)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 
Avg. shares of 
sellers in 
closed deals
#1
   
Average 
acceptanc
e rate 
   (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
           
           
N-C (No 
Rating, 
Complete 
Information) 
No qt is known 
to both 
sellers and 
buyers 
40 (4) 21.50 
[12.25] 
6.35 
[4.65] 
 
0.73 
[2.66] 
3.44 
[3.41] 
0.35 
[0.32] 
51.50% 73.20% 
R-C (Rating, 
Complete 
Information) 
Yes qt is known 
to both 
sellers and 
buyers 
40 (4) 19.58 
[11.84] 
5.76 
[4.59] 
0.54 
[0.18] 
3.54 
[2.83] 
0.39 
[0.22] 
49.74% 78.00% 
N-IC (No 
Rating, 
Incomplete 
Information) 
No qt is known 
only to 
sellers  
40 (4) 22.51 
[11.28] 
8.14 
[4.69] 
2.06 
[5.14] 
3.05 
[13.00] 
-1.53 
[6.55] 
238.42% 60.60% 
R-IC (Rating, 
Incomplete 
Information) 
Yes qt is known 
only to 
sellers  
40 (4) 19.92 
[11.97] 
8.26 
[4.72] 
2.14 
[4.50] 
-0.41 
[14.28] 
-2.11 
[7.11] 
240.40% 
 
65.10% 
All data --- --- 160 (16) 
20.88 
[11.90] 
7.13 
[4.79] 
1.36 
[3.74] 
2.41 
[10.04] 
-0.72 
[4.94] 
1.35 
[3.32] 
69.23% 
           
Notes: The numbers in squared bracket are standard errors. 
#1
 The average share of buyers in a given treatment is 100% minus the value in this 
column. 
#2
 The average size of the pie is ?̅?/2. 
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TABLE 2: The Determinants of the Rating Decisions by Buyers 
Dependent variable: Rating that buyer i gave to the matched seller j in period t ∈ {1, 2, …, 50} 
Notes: Individual random-effects tobit regressions with bootstrap standard errors (200 replications). Numbers in 
parenthesis are standard errors. Control variables include buyers’ demographic variables: a USA dummy (=1 if sessions 
were conducted in the USA; 0 otherwise), a female dummy (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), number of economics courses 
taken, general political orientation (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and income of the subject’s family. We 
omitted the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve space as these are not related to the 
hypotheses in the paper. 
#1
 H0: variable (a) + variable (e) + variable (f) = 0. 
#2 
H0: variable (a) + variable (e) = 0. 
#3 
H0: 
variable (b) + variable (g) + variable (h) = 0. 
#4 
H0: variable (b) + variable (g) = 0. 
#5 
H0: variable (a) + variable (f) = 0. 
#6  
H0: variable (b) + variable (h) = 0. 
#7
 p-values for the coefficient estimate of variable (a) or (b). 
 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively.  
     
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
(a) Seller’s keep in period t  
    (i.e., psj,t − qt/2) 
-0.575*** 
(0.063) 
-0.525*** 
(0.076) 
---- ---- 
     
(b) 
Seller’s keep in period 𝑡
𝑞𝑡/2
 ---- ---- -0.856*** 
(0.325) 
-0.435 
(0.662) 
     
(c) Deal Closed Dummy {which equals 1 if 
the trade is closed; 0 otherwise} 
1.404*** 
(0.576) 
4.862*** 
(0.682) 
2.697*** 
(0.526) 
2.471*** 
(0.670) 
     
(d) Complete Information dummy {which 
equals 1 for the N-C and R-C treatments; 
0 otherwise} 
0.935* 
(0.494) 
-2.658*** 
(0.781) 
1.119** 
(0.564) 
5.179*** 
(1.011) 
     
(e) Interaction term between variable (a) and 
variable (c) 
---- -0.448*** 
(0.060) 
---- ---- 
     
(f)  Interaction term between variable (a) and 
variable (d) 
---- 0.483*** 
(0.076) 
---- ---- 
     
(g) Interaction term between variable (b) and 
variable (c) 
---- ---- ---- -0.548 
(0.769) 
     
(h) Interaction term between variable (b) and 
variable (d) 
---- ---- ---- -7.603*** 
(1.448) 
     
Period Number (= {1, 2, …, 50}) -0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.014*** 
(0.006) 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
     
Constant 7.508*** 
(1.202) 
6.962*** 
(1.144) 
4.209*** 
(1.109) 
4.202*** 
(1.188) 
# of Observations 4,000 4,000 3,800 3,800 
Left-censored 688 688 584 584 
Right-censored 856 856 812 812 
Log likelihood -8232.86 -7966.17 -8066.05 -7919.92 
Wald chi
2
 197.35 229.02 55.90 102.87 
Prob > chi
2 
< 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
Two-sided p-value to the null that seller’s keep or keep share is a negative predictor for a seller’s rating score: 
When deals were closed:     
 R-C treatment ---- < 0.0001
#1
 ---- < 0.0001
#3
 
 R-IC treatment ---- < 0.0001
#2
 ---- 0.0448
#4
 
When deals were not closed:     
 R-C treatment ---- 0.3511
#5
 ---- < 0.0001
#6
 
 R-IC treatment ---- < 0.0001
#7
 ---- 0.5113
#7
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TABLE 3:  The Effects of Each Treatment Factor on Subjects’ Bargaining Behaviors 
 
 
  
  
Dependent  
Variable: 
Seller j’s keep in period t 
(= (𝑝𝑠𝑗
𝑡  –qt/2)) 
Buyer i’s keep in period t 
(= (qt – 𝑝𝑏𝑖
𝑡 )) 
Independent  
variables: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
  
  
 
  
  
(a) The R-C treatment dummy 
{= 1 for the R-C treatment; = 0 
otherwise} 
-0.373* 
(0.206) 
-0.340* 
(0.202) 
0.541* 
(0.294) 
0.949** 
(0.428) 
     
(b) The N-IC treatment dummy 
{= 1 for the N-IC treatment; = 
0 otherwise} 
2.103*** 
(0.328) 
2.049*** 
(0.302) 
-0.616 
(0.618) 
-1.506** 
(0.656) 
     
(c) The R-IC treatment dummy 
{= 1 for the R-IC treatment; = 
0 otherwise} 
2.618*** 
(0.477) 
2.577*** 
(0.445) 
-3.060*** 
(0.543) 
-3.774*** 
(0.479) 
     
Value of commodity in  
period t (i.e., qt) 
---- 0.033 
(0.063) 
---- 0.566*** 
(0.112) 
 
  
  
Period = {1, 2, …, 50} ---- 0.002 
(0.007) 
---- -0.018 
(0.015) 
     
Constant 5.672*** 
(0.442) 
4.940*** 
(1.292) 
3.137*** 
(0.640) 
-7.321*** 
(2.119) 
     
# of Observations 8000 8000 8000 8000 
Wald chi
2
 443.82 951.07 147.46 330.69 
Prob > chi
2
 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
Two-sided p-values (Wald Chi-square test results)   
Test 1: 
Ho: R-C = R-IC 
[i.e., variable (a) = variable (c)] 
 
< 0.0001 
 
< 0.0001 
 
< 0.0001 
 
< 0.0001 
Test 2: 
Ho: N-IC =R-IC 
[i.e., variable (b) = variable (c)] 
 
0.2054 
 
0.1687 
 
0.0013 
 
0.0017 
     
 
Notes: Random-effects linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session ID. Numbers in 
parenthesis are standard errors.  
  
Control variables include a USA dummy (=1 if sessions were conducted in the USA; 0 otherwise), a female dummy 
(=1 if female; 0 otherwise), number of economics courses taken, general political orientation (1 = very conservative 
to 7 = very liberal) and income of the subject’s family. We omitted the coefficient estimates of these demographic 
variables to conserve space since these are not related to the hypotheses in the paper.  
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
 
Period-by-Period Average Keep Shares of Buyers and Sellers in the N-C and R-C Treatments 
 
 (a) Buyers’ average keep shares: (𝑞 − 𝑝𝑏)/(𝑞/2)    (b) Sellers’ average keep shares: (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑞/2)/(𝑞/2) 
 
Note: Two observations in the N-C treatment and two observations in the R-C treatment in figure (a), and two 
observations in the N-C treatment in figure (b) are not shown because the values were above 110% or below 0%.  The 
lines of MA indicate simple moving averages of the previous five observations. 
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FIGURE 2  
 
 
Period-by-Period Buyers’ Average Purchase Thresholds and Sellers’ Average Keep Shares in the 
N-IC and R-IC Treatments 
  
 
(a2) Buyers’ average purchase thresholds: 𝑝𝑏       (b2) Sellers’ average keep shares: (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑞/2)/(𝑞/2) 
 
Note: One observation in the N-IC treatment and four observations in the R-IC treatment in figure (b2) are not shown 
because the values were above 800% or below 0%.  The lines of MA indicate simple moving averages of the previous 
five observations. 
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Appendix A: Theoretical Analysis 
A.1. Standard Theory Predictions for the N-C and R-C Treatments 
 For an assigned q  [0, 40], a seller maximizes his payoff with respect to the price 𝑝𝑠, 
given the paired buyer’s purchase threshold pb,: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 {(𝑝𝑠 −
1
2
𝑞) ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏{𝑝𝑠 ≤ 𝑝𝑏}}. 
Likewise, the buyer maximizes her payoff with respect to the purchase threshold 𝑝𝑏, given the 
paired seller’s offering price ps: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥{(𝑞 − 𝑝𝑠) ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏{𝑝𝑠 ≤ 𝑝𝑏}}. 
Thus, the best responses of the seller and buyer are calculated as below: 
Seller: 𝑝𝑠 = 𝑝𝑏 if 𝑝𝑏 −
1
2
𝑞 ≥ 0; 𝑝𝑠 = 𝜉 such that 𝜉 > 𝑝𝑏 if 𝑝𝑏 −
1
2
𝑞 < 0.   
Buyer: 𝑝𝑏 = 𝑝𝑠 if 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑠 ≥ 0; 𝑝𝑏 = 𝜈 such that 𝜈 < 𝑝𝑠 if 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑠 < 0.   
These best response correspondences are depicted as below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Figure A.1: The Best Response Strategies of the Seller and Buyer 
45º 
pb 
ps 
q/2 
q/2 
q 
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In Figure A.1, the red line and the red dash region indicate the best responses of the seller, whereas 
the blue line and the blue dash region indicate the best responses of the buyer. From this, the set of 
Nash equilibria where trades between the seller and the buyer are closed is summarized as below: 
{(𝑝𝑏, 𝑝𝑠)|𝑝𝑠 = 𝑝𝑏 = 𝑥 ∈ [
1
2
𝑞, 𝑞]}. 
In each equilibrium, the payoff of the seller (s) is x – q/2 and that of the buyer (b) is q – x. The 
set of Nash equilibria where trades between the seller and the buyer are not closed is summarized 
as below: 
{(𝑝𝑏, 𝑝𝑠)|𝑝𝑠 > 𝑞 and 𝑝𝑏 <
1
2
𝑞}. 
 
 
A.2. Inequality-Averse Preferences and Best Response Strategies for the N-C and R-C Treatments 
 Suppose that a seller is inequality-averse as defined in the paper: usj(𝜋𝑠𝑗, 𝜋𝑏𝑖) = 𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜇𝑗 ∙
(𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜋𝑏𝑖)
2
, where 𝜋𝑏𝑖 = (𝑞 – 𝑝𝑠𝑗) ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠𝑗≤𝑝𝑏𝑖} and 𝜋𝑠𝑗 = (𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
1
2
𝑞) ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠𝑗≤𝑝𝑏𝑖}. Here, 
1{𝑝𝑠𝑗≤𝑝𝑏𝑖} = 1 when 𝑝𝑠𝑗 ≤ 𝑝𝑏𝑖; = 0 otherwise. Then, given the matched buyer’s strategy, 𝑝𝑏𝑖, for 
each 𝑞 ∈ [0,40], seller j maximizes the following payoff with respect to 𝑝𝑠𝑗: 
{𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜋𝑏𝑖)
2
} ∙ 1
{𝑝𝑠𝑗≤𝑝𝑏𝑖}
. 
 = {𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
1
2
𝑞 − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
3
2
𝑞)
2
} ∙ 1
{𝑝𝑠𝑗≤𝑝𝑏𝑖}
, (A1) 
The term within the first curly bracket is maximized at: 𝑝𝑠𝑗 =
1
8𝜇𝑗
+
3
4
𝑞, as the derivative of it with 
respect to 𝑝𝑠𝑗 is: 1 + 6𝜇𝑗 ∙ 𝑞 − 8𝜇𝑗 ∙ 𝑝𝑠𝑗. The value in the first curly bracket at 𝑝𝑠𝑗 =
1
8𝜇𝑗
+
3
4
𝑞 
reduces to: 
1
4
𝑞 +
1
16𝜇𝑗
. 
 Thus, given 𝑝𝑏𝑖, if q is small enough that 𝑞 ≤
4
3
𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
6𝜇𝑗
 so that  𝑝𝑠𝑗 ≤ 𝑝𝑏𝑖, the seller’s best 
response function is given by: 𝑝𝑠𝑗 =
1
8𝜇𝑗
+
3
4
𝑞. By contrast, if q is large enough that 𝑞 >
4
3
𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
6𝜇𝑗
, 
then, 𝑝𝑠𝑗 = 𝑝𝑏𝑖 is the seller’s best response function if the value in the curly bracket is still positive 
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at 𝑝𝑠𝑗 = 𝑝𝑏𝑖: 𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
2
𝑞 − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
3
2
𝑞)
2
> 0; otherwise, 𝑝𝑠𝑗 > 𝑝𝑏𝑖 becomes his best response. 
In short, the seller’s best response function is summarized as: 
 𝑝𝑠𝑗 =
{
 
 
 
 
3
4
𝑞 +
1
8𝜇𝑗
,            if 𝑞 ≤
4
3
𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
6𝜇𝑗
.                                                                       
𝑝𝑏𝑖,                          if 𝑞 >
4
3
𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
6𝜇𝑗
 and 𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
2
𝑞 − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
3
2
𝑞)
2
> 0.
any 𝑐, s. t. 𝑐 > 𝑝𝑏𝑖, if 𝑞 >
4
3
𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
6𝜇𝑗
 and 𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
2
𝑞 − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
3
2
𝑞)
2
< 0.
 (A2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure A.2: The Best Response Strategy of the Seller 
 Here, the acceptance rate of the offering prices in the experiment would be q*/40 in 
expectation as q is randomly drawn from the uniform distribution between 0 and 40.  Note that the 
intercept in Figure A.2 (the seller’s best response price at q = 0) is 
1
8𝜇𝑗
. This is not dependent on pbi.  
If 𝑝𝑏𝑖 <
1
8𝜇𝑗
, then the seller’s best response strategy becomes as follows: 
 𝑝𝑠𝑗 = {
𝑝𝑏𝑖,                         if 𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
2
𝑞 − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
3
2
𝑞)
2
> 0
any 𝑐, s. t. 𝑐 > 𝑝𝑏𝑖, if 𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
2
𝑞 − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
3
2
𝑞)
2
< 0.
 (A3) 
For simplicity, we assume that 𝑝𝑏𝑖 >
1
8𝜇𝑗
 in the rest of this Appendix A.  
𝑝𝑠𝑗 
𝑞 
𝑝𝑏𝑖 
1
8𝜇𝑗
 
4
3
𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
6𝜇𝑗
 
40 
40 
q* such that 𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
2
𝑞 − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
3
2
𝑞)
2
= 0 
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Also, Note that 
𝜕𝑞∗
𝜕𝑝𝑏𝑖
> 0 since 𝑞∗ is a point at which y = 𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
2
𝑞 and y = 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
3
2
𝑞)
2
 
intersect; and both curves shift to the right when pbi increases as shown in the following figure.
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, we find that the seller’s best response strategies shift as below responding to a chance in pbi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.3: The Seller’s Best Response Strategies for Various pbi 
Note: The solid (dashed) line indicates the best response strategy of seller j when faced with 𝑝𝑏𝑖 (𝑝𝑏𝑖
′ ).  
 
                                                          
2
 𝑞∗ can be greater than 40. In that case, the seller’s best response price is less than or equal to 𝑝𝑏𝑖  for any value q  
[0,40]. 
𝑝𝑠𝑗  
𝑞 
𝑝𝑏𝑖 
1
8𝜇𝑗
 
4
3
𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
6𝜇𝑗
 
40 
40 
q* such that 𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
2
𝑞∗ − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
3
2
𝑞∗)
2
= 0 
𝑝𝑏𝑖
′  
4
3
𝑝𝑏𝑖
′ −
1
6𝜇𝑗
 
q** such that 
 𝑝𝑏𝑖
′ −
1
2
𝑞∗∗ − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑏𝑖
′ −
3
2
𝑞∗∗)
2
= 0 
𝑞∗∗ 
y 
𝑞 
𝑝𝑏𝑖 
4
3
𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
6𝜇𝑗
 
40 
y = 𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
1
2
𝑞 
y = 𝜇𝑗 (2𝑝𝑏𝑖 −
3
2
𝑞)
2
 
4
3
𝑝𝑏𝑖 
2𝑝𝑏𝑖 
𝑞∗ 
𝑝𝑏𝑖 increases 𝑝𝑏𝑖 increases 
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Suppose also that the buyer is inequality-averse as assumed in the paper: ubi(𝜋𝑏𝑖, 𝜋𝑠𝑗) = 
𝜋𝑏𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖 ∙ (𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜋𝑏𝑖)
2
. Notice here that the utility weight on inequality μi is different from that of 
seller μj. The buyer maximizes her utility, given psj: 
ubi(𝜋𝑏𝑖, 𝜋𝑠𝑗) = [𝑞 – 𝑝𝑠𝑗 − 𝜇𝑖 ∙ (2𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
3
2
𝑞)
2
] ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠𝑗≤𝑝𝑏𝑖}. 
This means that the buyer’s best response strategy is: pbi ≥ psj when ubi = 𝑞 – 𝑝𝑠𝑗 − 𝜇𝑖 ∙
(2𝑝
𝑠𝑗
−
3
2
𝑞)
2
≥ 0, but pbi = ξ, such that ξ < psj if 𝑞 – 𝑝𝑠𝑗 − 𝜇𝑖 ∙ (2𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
3
2
𝑞)
2
< 0. For a given q, 
this best response correspondences of the buyer and those of the seller described in Conditions 
(A2) and (A3) characterize the set of the Nash Equilibria. 
 
A.3. Standard Theory Predictions for the N-IC and R-IC Treatments 
 For each q  [0, 40], given the buyer’s purchase threshold pb, the seller maximizes his 
payoff with respect to the price 𝑝𝑠: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 {(𝑝𝑠 −
1
2
𝑞) ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏{𝑝𝑠 ≤ 𝑝𝑏}}. 
We obtain, from this maximization problem, the best response function of the seller as follows: 
 𝑏𝑠(𝑞) = {
𝑝𝑏                    for 2𝑝𝑏 ≥ 𝑞.
?̃? 𝑠. 𝑡. ?̃? > 𝑝𝑏 for 2𝑝𝑏 < 𝑞.
 (A4) 
 Likewise, given the seller’s strategy 𝑝𝑠(𝑞), the buyer maximizes her expected payoff with 
respect to 𝑝𝑏 as the value of the commodity is unknown to her. This reduces to the following 
maximization problem: 
 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝜋𝑏 = ∫ (𝑞 − 𝑝𝑠(𝑞)) ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠(𝑞)≤𝑝𝑏}
40
0
∙
1
40
𝑑𝑞}.. (A5) 
There exist Bayesian Nash Equilibria characterized by the seller’s best response specified in 
condition (A4) and the following best response strategy of the buyer: 
  𝑝𝑏 ≥ 𝑝𝑠, if 𝑝𝑠 ≤ 20; 𝑝𝑏 < 𝑝𝑠, if 𝑝𝑠 > 20. (A6) 
Specifically, the following is an example of the equilibria: ps = c for q such that 𝑞 ≤ 2𝑐;  
and 𝑝𝑠(𝑞) = 𝑞 for q such that 𝑞 > 2𝑐, while pb = c. Here, c is any integer which is less than or 
equal to 20. With this equilibrium, the expected payoff of the seller is: 
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𝜋𝑠 = ∫ (𝑐 − 𝑞/2)
2𝑐
0
∙
1
40
𝑑𝑞 =
1
40
[𝑐𝑞 −
1
4
𝑞2]|
𝑞=0
2𝑐
=
𝑐2
40
 (> 0), 
and the expected payoff of the buyer is: 
∫ (𝑞 − 𝑐)
2𝑐
0
∙
1
40
𝑑𝑞 = (
1
2
𝑞2 − 𝑐𝑞) ∙
1
40
|
0
2𝑐
= 0. 
There is no profitable deviation not only for the seller but also for the buyer. There are many 
equilibria of this kind. 
 There is also another kind of equilibrium in which the transaction is not exerted. The 
following is an example: the seller posts a price which is greater than or equal to 20 always, and 
the buyer sets her purchase threshold at 0.  
       
 
A.4. Inequality-Averse Preferences and Best Response Strategies for the N-IC and R-IC 
Treatments 
 The best response of the seller is the same as the one discussed in Section A.2.   
 For the best response of the buyer, suppose that the buyer is also inequality-averse as the 
seller: ubi(𝜋𝑏𝑖, 𝜋𝑠𝑗) = 𝜋𝑏𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖 ∙ (𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜋𝑏𝑖)
2
. Then, the buyer’s best response strategy is derived 
by maximizing the following her expected utility given the seller’s strategy, 𝑝𝑠𝑗 = 𝑝𝑠(𝑞): 
 𝐸𝑞[𝑢𝑏𝑖(𝜋𝑏𝑖, 𝜋𝑠𝑗)] = 𝐸𝑞 [{𝜋𝑏𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖 ∙ (𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜋𝑏𝑖)
2
} ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠(𝑞)≤𝑝𝑏𝑖}]. (A7) 
That is, 
 𝑝𝑏(𝜇𝑖) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥 . 𝐸𝑞 [{𝜋𝑏𝑖 − 𝜇𝑖 ∙ (𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜋𝑏𝑖)
2
} ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠(𝑞)≤𝑥}]. (A8) 
Here, suppose that 𝑝𝑠(𝑞) is non-decreasing in q. Then, (A8) reduces to the following:  
𝐸𝑞[𝑢𝑏𝑖(𝜋𝑏𝑖, 𝜋𝑠𝑗)] = ∫ [𝑞 − 𝑝𝑠(𝑞) − 𝜇𝑖 ∙ (2𝑝𝑠(𝑞) −
3
2
𝑞)
2
] ∙
1
40
𝑑𝑞
𝑝𝑠
−1(𝑝𝑏𝑖)
0
. (A9) 
Here, 𝑝𝑠
−1(𝑝𝑏𝑖) is the upper bound if it responds multiple values (correspondence). Since the 
condition of non-negative utility must be met, we have: 
 ∫ [𝑞 − 𝑝𝑠(𝑞) − 𝜇𝑖 ∙ (2𝑝𝑠(𝑞) −
3
2
𝑞)
2
] 𝑑𝑞
𝑝𝑠
−1(𝑝𝑏𝑖)
0
≥ 0. (A10) 
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Although there are multiple equilibria, there is a common feature that the buyer also obtains a 
positive material payoff in expectation. This is because condition (A10) implies that: 
∫ [𝑞 – 𝑝𝑠(𝑞)] 𝑑𝑞
𝑝𝑠
−1(𝑝𝑏𝑖)
0
≥ ∫ 𝜇𝑖 ∙ [2𝑝𝑠(𝑞) −
3
2
𝑞]2𝑑𝑞
𝑝𝑠
−1(𝑝𝑏𝑖)
0
 > 0. 
The BNE is characterized by (A2) (or A3), (A8) and (A10). 
     
 From Figure A.3, we have the following features of the equilibria:  
(1) The higher the buyer’s equilibrium purchase threshold 𝑝𝑏𝑖
∗ , the higher the acceptance rate. 
(2) Regardless of which purchase threshold is realized in equilibrium, the seller’s equilibrium price 
is increasing in q and less than 𝑝𝑏𝑖
∗ , in a region where 𝑞 ≤
4
3
𝑝𝑏𝑖
∗ −
1
6𝜇𝑗
. 
(3) No trades are closed in the region where q > q*. 
 
A.5. Disapproval Aversion and the Transactions between the Seller and the Buyer in the R-C 
treatment 
 In this analysis, we assume that the seller’s payoff function is expressed as in Eq. (4) of the 
paper (i.e., 𝜋𝑠𝑗
′ = 𝜋𝑠𝑗 + 𝑐 ∙ (𝑟 –  5)). Then, the utility of seller j is expressed as:  
usj(𝜋𝑏𝑖, 𝜋𝑠𝑗
′ ) = {𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
1
2
𝑞 + 𝑐 ∙ (𝑟 –  5) − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
3
2
𝑞 + 𝑐 ∙ (𝑟 –  5))
2
} ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠𝑗≤𝑝𝑏𝑖} 
+{𝑐 ∙ (𝑟 –  5) − 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (𝑐 ∙ (𝑟 –  5))
2
} ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠𝑗>𝑝𝑏𝑖}. 
Likewise, the utility of buyer i is expressed as: 
ubi(𝜋𝑏𝑖, 𝜋𝑠𝑗
′ ) = {𝑞 − 𝑝𝑠𝑗 − 𝜇𝑖 ∙ (2𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
3
2
𝑞 + 𝑐 ∙ (𝑟 –  5))
2
} ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠𝑗≤𝑝𝑏𝑖} 
+{−𝜇𝑖 ∙ (𝑐 ∙ (𝑟 –  5))
2
} ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠𝑗>𝑝𝑏𝑖}. 
We can solve this situation from the second stage (the rating stage) [backward induction].  
The second stage (rating stage): 
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If 𝑝𝑠𝑗 > 𝑝𝑏𝑖, buyer i receives a material payoff of 0 points. In the rating stage, the buyer 
minimizes the term: 𝜇𝑖 ∙ (𝑐 ∙ (𝑟 –  5))
2
. This means that the buyer’s best response rating score is: 
r* = 5. 
If 𝑝𝑠𝑗 ≤ 𝑝𝑏𝑖, in the rating stage, the buyer tries to minimize the term: 𝜇𝑗 ∙ (2𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
3
2
𝑞 + 𝑐 ∙
(𝑟 –  5))
2
. From 2𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
3
2
𝑞 + 𝑐 ∙ (𝑟 –  5) = 0, we find: 
𝑟 = 5 +
3
2𝑐
𝑞 −
2
𝑐
𝑝𝑠𝑗.  
This is the condition of interior solutions. The negative slope (– 2/c) shows a negative correlation 
between r and psj. The buyer’s best response correspondence differ by q because 0 ≤ r ≤ 10. We 
have the following three cases, considering the size of intercept (5 +
3
2𝑐
𝑞): 
 (i) If 𝑝𝑠𝑗 is small enough that 𝑝𝑠𝑗 ≤ −
5
2
𝑐 +
3
4
𝑞, r* = 10. 
(ii) If 𝑝𝑠𝑗 is high enough that 𝑝𝑠𝑗 >
5
2
𝑐 +
3
4
𝑞, r* = 0. 
(ii) If 𝑝𝑠𝑗 ∈ [−
5
2
𝑐 +
3
4
𝑞,
5
2
𝑐 +
3
4
𝑞], r* = 5 +
3
2𝑐
𝑞 −
2
𝑐
𝑝𝑠𝑗 . 
[When 𝑞 ≥
10c
3
:] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
3q/4–5c/2 ps 
  r 
3q/4+5c/2 
𝑟 = 5 +
3
2𝑐
𝑞 −
2
𝑐
𝑝𝑠 
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[When 𝑞 <
10c
3
:] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The optimality condition suggests a negative correlation between r and psj. 
 In the second stage, there are no real decisions to make for the sellers. 
The first stage (the transaction between the seller and buyer): 
The buyer’s best response can be quickly derived. Given 𝑝𝑠𝑗, if 𝑞 − 𝑝𝑠𝑗 − 𝜇𝑗 ∙
(2𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
3
2
𝑞 + 𝑐 ∙ (𝑟∗ –  5))
2
≥ 0, she submits a purchase threshold which is higher than or equal 
to 𝑝𝑠𝑗. Here, r* is the buyer’s best response strategy for rating in the following rating stage. It is 
clear that because of the rating opportunities, the inequality-averse term in her utility function is 
smaller in the R-C treatment than in the N-C treatment. Therefore, materially unequal offers by the 
seller are more likely to be accepted by the buyer. This is consistent with the idea that the buyer 
substitutes expressing emotions for rejecting offers. 
 As for the seller, we first consider the interior solution case in the rating stage (see the 
above). In this case, the seller’s utility is: {𝑝𝑠𝑗 −
1
2
𝑞 + 𝑐 ∙ (𝑟∗ –  5)} ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠𝑗≤𝑝𝑏𝑖} = {𝑞 − 𝑝𝑠𝑗} ∙
3q/4+5c/2 ps 
  r 
5 +
3
2𝑐
𝑞 
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1{𝑝𝑠𝑗≤𝑝𝑏𝑖} whereas the buyers’ utility is: {𝑞 − 𝑝𝑠𝑗} ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠𝑗≤𝑝𝑏𝑖}. The seller chooses his possible 
minimum price to offer. The buyer’s best response strategy is to submit 𝑝𝑏𝑖 so that 𝑝𝑠𝑗 ≤ 𝑝𝑏𝑖 
whenever 𝑝𝑠𝑗 ≤ 𝑞 (her payoff is positive). Thus, in this case, the unique equilibrium is: 𝑝𝑠𝑗 =
−
5
2
𝑐 +
3
4
𝑞 and 𝑝𝑏𝑖 = 𝑥 such that 𝑥 ≥ −
5
2
𝑐 +
3
4
𝑞. Thus, we see that the seller chooses to offer 
lower prices in the R-C treatment so as to avoid receiving disapproval points or to enjoy positive 
psychological gains. 
 When r* = 10 or 0 (corner solution), from ∂sj/∂psj = 0, we have: 
Case 1: 𝑝𝑠𝑗 =
1
8𝜇
+
3
4
𝑞 −
5𝑐
2
 when r* = 10, if the seller’s utility is then non-negative. 
Case 2: 𝑝𝑠𝑗 =
1
8𝜇
+
3
4
𝑞 +
5𝑐
2
 when r* = 0, if the seller’s utility is then non-negative. 
Case 1 is not a solution because the buyer sets r* = 10 if 𝑝𝑠𝑗 <
3
4
𝑞 −
5𝑐
2
. By contrast, Case 
1 holds as a corner solution because 𝑝𝑠𝑗 >
5𝑐
2
+
3
4
𝑞 (see Case II in the analysis of the second stage).  
The buyer submits 𝑝𝑏𝑖 so that 𝑝𝑠𝑗 ≤ 𝑝𝑏𝑖 as long as the buyer’s utility is positive. Thus, in the 
corner solution, the seller offers a materially less fair amount (higher price) to the buyer and the 
buyer selects r* = 0 in the second stage. 
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A.6. Inequality Aversion, Disappointment Aversion, and Players’ Best Responses in N-IC and R-
IC treatments 
 In this subsection, we study how theoretical predictions may change if inequality-averse 
actors also exhibit disappointment aversion due to asymmetric information on q in the incomplete 
information treatments. For simplicity, we assume that sellers do not exhibit social disapproval 
aversion in this analysis. That is, we assume that buyers’ rating behaviors will not affect the 
utilities of sellers.
 
We note that calculations become messy if we have both disapproval aversion 
and disappointment aversion in the model. However, even if we incorporate both disapproval 
aversion and disappointment aversion into the modeling of subjects’ inequality-averse preference 
(Eqs. (1) to (3)) with the assumption that buyers can cancel out negative emotions from 
disappointment by releasing the emotions, we obtain the same implications (the degree of inequity 
acceptance is stronger in the incomplete information than in the complete information settings 
because of disappointment aversion). In this Appendix, we show a simpler version of the analysis 
for an illustrative purpose. 
We assume that, with incomplete information (when 𝑞 is unknown to buyers), buyers select 
𝑝𝑏 based on the expected value of 𝑞. In a model with disappointment aversion (e.g., Bonomo, 
Garcia, Meddahi, and Tédongap 2010, Gul 1991, Routledge and Zin 2010), buyer i will incur a 
psychological disutility when realized 𝑞𝑡 was less than his or her expectation (i.e., E(q) = 20). The 
absolute value of i’s psychological loss is assumed to be increasing in 𝑝𝑏. We will incorporate the 
model of disappointment aversion into our model with inequality aversion (Eqs. (1) to (3) in the 
paper) as follows. First, we write the payoff function of buyer i in the N-IC treatment as below: 
𝜋𝑏
𝑁 = {(𝑞𝑡 − 𝑝𝑠) + 𝑝𝑏α(q − 20) ∙ 1{𝑞<20}} ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏},. 
where 1 > α > 0. 
We further assume that buyers’ loss from disappointment would be 0 once it is released (see 
psychological papers for this argument, such as Xiao and Houser (2005), Campbell-Sills et al. 
(2006), and Gross and John (2003)). This means that buyers strategically utilize the rating 
opportunity to deal with their negative emotions from disappointment (realized low 𝑞𝑡). In other 
words, buyers do not utilize rating opportunities to verbally punish or reward the behavior of their 
matched sellers. Based on this assumption, we can write the payoff function of buyer i in R-IC 
treatment as below. 
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𝜋𝑏
𝑅 = (𝑞𝑡 − 𝑝𝑠) ∙ 1{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏}. 
Second, we calculate the utilities of buyer i and seller j in the incomplete information treatments 
based on Eqs. (1) to (3): 
𝑢𝑏
𝑅 = {𝜋𝑏 − 𝜇𝑖(𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜋𝑏𝑖)
2}. 
𝑢𝑏
𝑁 = {𝜋𝑏
𝑁 − 𝜇𝑖(𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜋𝑏𝑖
𝑁 )2}... 
𝑢𝑠
𝑅 = {𝜋𝑠 − 𝜇𝑗(𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜋𝑏)
2}. 
𝑢𝑠
𝑁 = {𝜋𝑠 − 𝜇𝑗(𝜋𝑠𝑗 − 𝜋𝑏
𝑁)2}. 
Here, the superscripts N and R refer to treatments without and with rating opportunities, 
respectively. 
In Section A.6, we denote 𝑝𝑏
𝑁 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸(𝑢𝑏
𝑁); 
𝑝𝑏
𝑅 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸(𝑢𝑏
𝑅); 
𝑝𝑠
𝑁 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑢𝑠
𝑁; 
𝑝𝑠
𝑅 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑢𝑠
𝑅. 
 
Proposition 1. 𝑝𝑏
𝑁 ≤ 𝑝𝑏
𝑅. 
Proof.  
Let 𝑟−(𝑞) = α(q − 20) ∙ 1{𝑞<20}.  
We can rewrite 𝜋𝑏
𝑁 as: 
𝜋𝑏
𝑁 = 𝜋𝑏
𝑅 + 𝑟−𝑝𝑏1{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏}. 
Thus we have: 
𝐸(𝑢𝑏
𝑁) =
1
40
∫ 𝜋𝑏
𝑁 − 𝜇(𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑏
𝑁)2
40
0
. 
              =
1
40
∫ 𝜋𝑏
𝑅 + 𝑟−𝑝𝑏1{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏} − 𝜇(𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑏
𝑅)2 + 2𝜇(𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑏
𝑅)𝑟−𝑝𝑏 − 𝜇(𝑟
−)2
40
0
𝑝𝑏
21{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏}. 
              =  𝐸(𝑢𝑏
𝑅) +
1
40
∫ 𝑟−𝑝𝑏1{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏} + 2𝜇(𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑏
𝑅)𝑟−𝑝𝑏 − 𝜇(𝑟
−)2
40
0
𝑝𝑏
21{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏}. 
              =  𝐸(𝑢𝑏
𝑅) +
1
40
∫ 𝑟−𝑝𝑏1{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏}
40
0
. 
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             +
1
40
∫ 2𝜇(𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑏
𝑅)𝑟−𝑝𝑏1{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏}
40
0
. 
            −
1
40
∫ 𝜇(𝑟−)2𝑝𝑏
21{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏}
40
0
. 
Here, we call: 
1
40
∫ 𝑟−𝑝𝑏1{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏}
40
0
= 𝐴(𝑝𝑏), 
1
40
∫ 2𝜇(𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑏
𝑅)𝑟−𝑝𝑏1{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏}
40
0
= B(𝑝𝑏), 
−
1
40
∫ 𝜇(𝑟−)2𝑝𝑏
21{𝑝𝑠≤𝑝𝑏}
40
0
= 𝐶(𝑝𝑏). 
We can show that A, B, C are non-positive decreasing functions. 
   First, because (𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑏) ≥ 0, 𝑟
− ≤ 0, A and B are non-positive, decreasing functions, 
respectively. Second, (𝑟−)2 ≥ 0 implies that C is also a non-positive decreasing function. 
Now suppose that y > 𝑝𝑏
𝑅. Then, 
𝐸(𝑢𝑏
𝑁)(𝑦) = 𝐸(𝑢𝑏
𝑅)(𝑦) + 𝐴(𝑦) + 𝐵(𝑦) + 𝐶(𝑦) 
< 𝐸(𝑢𝑏
𝑅)(𝑝𝑏
𝑅) + 𝐴(𝑝𝑏
𝑅) + 𝐵(𝑝𝑏
𝑅) + 𝐶(𝑝𝑏
𝑅) = 𝐸(𝑢𝑏
𝑁)(𝑝𝑏
𝑅). 
This means that 𝑦 ≠ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐸(𝑢𝑏
𝑁)), which implies 𝑝𝑏
𝑁 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐸(𝑢𝑏
𝑁)) ≤ 𝑝𝑏
𝑅. 
 
Proposition 2. When 𝑞 is small enough, 𝑝𝑠
𝑁 < 𝑝𝑠
𝑅 
Sellers’ best responses in R-IC treatment is (A2). By using the same calculation process as in (A2), 
we can find sellers’ best response function in N-IC treatment. 
𝑝𝑠
𝑁 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
8𝜇𝑗
+
3
4
𝑞 +
𝑓(𝑞)
2
𝑝
𝑏
,                                                      if 
1
8𝜇𝑗
+
3
4
𝑞 +
𝑓(𝑞)
2
𝑝
𝑏
≤ 𝑝
𝑏
𝑝
𝑏
,                                if 
1
8𝜇𝑗
+
3
4
𝑞 +
𝑓(𝑞)
2
𝑝
𝑏
> 𝑝
𝑏
 and 𝜋𝑠 − 𝜇𝑗(𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑏
𝑁)2 > 0
any 𝑐 > 𝑝
𝑏
,                if 
1
8𝜇𝑗
+
3
4
𝑞 +
𝑓(𝑞)
2
𝑝
𝑏
> 𝑝
𝑏
 and 𝜋𝑠 − 𝜇𝑗(𝜋𝑠 − 𝜋𝑏
𝑁)2 ≤ 0
where 𝑓(𝑞) = 𝛼(𝑞 − 20)1{𝑞<20}
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Appendix B: Additional Tables 
TABLE B.1: 
The Determinants of the Acceptance Rates of Offers 
 
 
Dependent variable: Dummy which equals 1 if a transaction between buyer i and  
seller j was closed in period t 
 
 
 
  Independent variables  (1) (2) 
 
     (a) Value of the commodity in period t 
(qt) {= 0, 1, …, 39, 40} 
-0.022*** 
(0.002) 
-0.023*** 
(0.004) 
   
(b) Rating dummy {which equals 1 for the 
R-C or R-IC treatment; 0 otherwise} 
0.053 
(0.052) 
0.003 
(0.133) 
   
(c) Complete Information dummy {which 
equals 1 for the N-C and R-C treatments; 
0 otherwise} 
0.419*** 
(0.069) 
0.482*** 
(0.074) 
   
 (d) Period = {1, 2, …, 50} 0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
   
(a)  (b) --- 0.002 
(0.005) 
   
(b)  (d) --- 0.0002 
(0.003) 
   
(c)  (d) --- -0.003 
(0.002) 
   
Constant 0.611*** 
(0.141) 
0.609*** 
(0.156) 
   
# of Observations 8000 8000 
Log Likelihood -4483.90 -4482.83 
Wald chi
2
 249.37 221.32 
Prob > chi
2
 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
 
   
 
Notes: Random-effects probit regressions with bootstrap standard errors (the number of replications is 200). Numbers 
in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
 
Demographic variables of buyers and sellers are included to control for 
individual characteristics. Control variables include a USA dummy (=1 if sessions were conducted in the USA; 0 
otherwise), a female dummy (=1 if female; and 0 otherwise), number of economics courses taken, general political 
orientation (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and income of the subject’s family. We omitted the coefficient 
estimates of these demographic variables to conserve space since these are not related to the hypotheses in the paper. 
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively. 
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TABLE B.2: 
The Determinants of the Rating Decisions by Buyers (Supplementing Table 2 of the paper) 
 
Dependent variable: Rating that buyer i gave to the matched seller j in period t ∈ {1, 2, …, 50} 
 
The following are the estimation results with the Heckman’s two-stage selection model. 
 
[Second Stage Regression] 
 
 
Notes:  Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors.  Control variables include buyers’ demographic variables: a 
USA dummy (=1 if sessions were conducted in the USA; 0 otherwise), a female dummy (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), 
number of economics courses taken, general political orientation (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and 
income of the subject’s family. We omitted the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve space 
as these are not related to the hypotheses in the paper. 
 
  
 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively. 
  
 
 
   
 When deals 
were closed 
When deals 
were not closed 
When deals 
were closed 
When deals 
were not closed 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
   
 
 
   
(a) Seller’s keep in period t  
    (i.e., psj,t − qt/2) 
-0.594*** 
(0.014) 
-0.388*** 
(0.022) 
---- ---- 
     
(b) 
Seller’s keep in period 𝑡
𝑞𝑡/2
 ---- ---- -0.324*** 
(0.016) 
-0.235*** 
(0.026) 
     
     
(c) Complete Information dummy {which 
equals 1 for the N-C and R-C 
treatments; 0 otherwise} 
-1.448*** 
(0.202) 
-5.704*** 
(0.408) 
3.268*** 
(0.343) 
-1.603 
(1.064) 
     
(d) Interaction term between variable (a) 
and variable (c) 
0.484*** 
(0.025) 
0.376*** 
(0.034) 
---- ---- 
     
(e)  Interaction term between variable (b) 
and variable (d) 
---- ---- -2.579*** 
(0.521) 
-1.359 
(1.413) 
     
Period Number (= {1, 2, …, 50}) -0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.022*** 
(0.006) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.018** 
(0.007) 
     
Constant 9.292*** 
(0.318) 
7.112*** 
(0.570) 
5.697*** 
(0.344) 
4.661*** 
(0.504) 
# of Observations 3,920 3,920 3,720 3,720 
Censored observations 1072 2848 1019 2701 
Wald chi
2
 2358.52 683.52 921.1 364.96 
Prob > chi
2 
< 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
     
Two-sided p-value for the null:     
H0: variable (a) = 0 < 0.001 < 0.0001 ---- ---- 
H0: variable (b) = 0 ---- ---- < 0.0001 < 0.0001 
H0: variable (a) + variable (d) = 0 < 0.001 0.6909 ---- ---- 
H0: variable (b) + variable (e) = 0 ---- ---- < 0.0001 0.2567 
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Please note that the absolute values of coefficient estimates in column (1’) are identical to those in 
column (2’) with the sign being opposite. The same holds between columns (3’) and (4’). 
 
Equations (1’), (2’), (3’) and (4’) in the table are the selection equations of columns (1), (2), 
(3),and (4), respectively, on the previous page. 
 
 
Notes:  Numbers in parenthesis are robust standard errors. 
 
 Control variables include buyers’ demographic variables: a 
USA dummy (=1 if sessions were conducted in the USA; 0 otherwise), a female dummy (=1 if female; 0 otherwise), 
numbers of economics courses taken, general political orientation (1 = very conservative to 7 = very liberal) and 
income of the subject’s family. We omitted the coefficient estimates of these demographic variables to conserve space 
as these are not related to the hypotheses in the paper. 
 
  
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the 0.01 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 When deals 
were closed 
When deals 
were not closed 
When deals 
were closed 
When deals 
were not closed 
Independent variables (1’) (2’) (3’) (4’) 
 
 
   
 
 
   
Buyers’ last period purchase threshold  
(i.e., 𝑝𝑏𝑖
𝑡−1) [instrument] 
0.032*** 
(0.003) 
-0.032*** 
(0.003) 
0.035*** 
(0.003) 
-0.035*** 
(0.003) 
     
(a) Seller’s keep in period t  
    (i.e., psj,t − qt/2) 
-0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
---- ---- 
     
(b) 
Seller’s keep in period 𝑡
𝑞𝑡/2
 ---- ---- 0.025*** 
(0.007) 
-0.025*** 
(0.007) 
     
     
(c) Complete Information dummy {which 
equals 1 for the N-C and R-C 
treatments; 0 otherwise} 
0.891*** 
(0.089) 
-0.891*** 
(0.089) 
3.219*** 
(0.160) 
-3.219*** 
(0.160) 
     
(d) Interaction term between variable (a) 
and variable (c) 
-0.062*** 
(0.011) 
0.062*** 
(0.011) 
---- ---- 
     
(e)  Interaction term between variable (b) 
and variable (d) 
---- ---- -4.392*** 
(0.251) 
4.392*** 
(0.251) 
     
Period Number (= {1, 2, …, 50}) 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
     
Constant -0.328*** 
(0.116) 
0.328*** 
(0.116) 
-0.691*** 
(0.115) 
0.691*** 
(0.115) 
 
 
   
